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 )I Conceptual Notes
 Toward A Definition of Organizational Politics1
 BRONSTON T. MAYES
 University of Nebraska, Lincoln
 ROBERT W. ALLEN
 California State University, Fullerton
 Viewing organizations as political entities is
 not a recent phenomenon. March (7) suggested
 that organizations are political coalitions in
 which decisions are made and goals are set by
 bargaining processes. Other writers stressed the
 utility of taking a political perspective when
 studying organizations (1, 6, 9, 22). Anyone asso-
 ciated with almost any form of organization
 eventually becomes aware of activities that are
 described by employees as "political", but what
 is termed political by one observer may not be
 viewed as political by another. To understand the
 nature of political processes in organizations,
 some agreement as to what constitutes political
 behavior must be developed. This article at-
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 tempts to shed light on the organizational politi-
 cal process by constructing a literature-derived
 definition of organizational politics (OP). Guid-
 ing this effort are the following assumptions:
 1. Behavior referred to as politics takes
 place in varying degrees in all organiza-
 tions.
 2. Not all behavior in organizations can be
 categorized as political.
 3. The organizational political process can
 be described in non-evaluative terms.
 4. While many variables involved in de-
 scribing organizational politics may be
 familiar to other organizational behavior
 concepts, a combination of these varia-
 1 Portions of this article were presented at the thirty-sixth
 annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Kansas City,
 Missouri, August 13, 1976. The helpful comments of Anthony
 T. Cobb are gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks are ex-
 tended to Dan Madison, who commented on earlier drafts of
 this manuscript and helped with data analysis.
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 bles constitutes a unique process that
 cannot be described adequately by ex-
 isting paradigms. This unique process is
 organizational politics.
 Earlier Attempts to Define
 Organizational Politics
 Claims Against the Resource Sharing System
 Political behavior in an organization has
 been viewed as actions that make a claim against
 the organization's resource sharing system. Har-
 vey and Mills (4) utilized this definition in their
 treatment of the political aspects of adaptation to
 change. Their basic premise was that any adap-
 tive change will produce conflict through its ef-
 fect on the distribution of scarce resources
 among organizational units. This conflict was
 thought to be resolved by political processes in-
 cluding coalition formation, bargaining, side-
 payments, etc.
 In a study of decision processes employed in
 purchasing computer equipment, Pettigrew (11)
 defined the political process as generation of de-
 mands for resources and mobilization of support
 for the demands generated.
 Although some claims against an organiza-
 tion's resource sharing system may constitute
 political behavior, normally many of these claims
 would not be considered political. For example,
 an employee's asking for a salary raise, which
 constitutes a claim against the resource sharing
 system, would not be political behavior, but the
 use of threat to unionize to obtain a raise would
 be considered a political act. Circumstances sur-
 rounding the demand process must be consid-
 ered in defining OP.
 Conflict Over Policy Preferences
 Wildavsky (21) suggests that the budgeting
 process is a political method of allocating finan-
 cial resources, a notion consistent with the earli-
 er Cyert and March (3) proposal that the budget
 represents the outcome of bargaining in the or-
 ganization coalition. Wildavsky defines politics
 as conflict over whose preferences are to prevail
 in the determination of policy.
 To define politics as a form of conflict seems
 too narrow an approach, especially when one
 limits politics to the conflict over policy deci-
 sions. The administration of policy involves polit-
 ical activities in its own right. Thus, a suitable def-
 inition of OP must include the politics of policy
 implementation as well as the politics of policy
 determination.
 Another view of politics in the determina-
 tion of policy is proposed by Wamsley and Zald
 (19). Their work relating to public organizations
 defines politics as the structure and process of
 the uses of authority and power to define goals,
 directions, and major parameters of the organi-
 zational economy. This definition may be suit-
 able at upper levels of the organization but polit-
 ical processes also take place at lower levels
 where policy or system-wide decisions are not
 made.
 Relationships of Control and Influence
 In discussing power tactics used by execu-
 tives, Martin and Sims (8) state that politics is con-
 cerned with relationships of control or influence.
 Although control, power, and influence are key
 issues in the study of OP, this approach allows in-
 clusion of behaviors and forms of influence not
 normally considered political. An example of a
 non-political means of control in an organization
 is the periodic performance review when done
 in accordance with policy guidelines normally
 provided for this purpose. The review/appraisal
 constitutes a form of feedback to the ratee on
 his/her job performance and is a form of influ-
 ence or control in that the employee is expected
 to correct performance deficiencies.
 Burns (2) viewed politics as the exploitation
 of resources, physical and human, for achieve-
 ment of more control over others, and thus of
 safer, more comfortable, or more satisfying terms
 of individual existence. Although this is a quite
 agreeable definition of politics, it fails to account
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 for the fact that controlling others for personal
 benefit makes determination of what is political
 and what is not a province of the intent of the
 actor. A more rigorous approach would allow a
 definition of OP based on observable criteria ex-
 clusive of the actor's intent.
 Self-Serving Behavior
 Some writers have considered politics as be-
 havior directed toward personal gain (2, 14). Al-
 though this approach is intuitively appealing, the
 argument can be made that all willful behavior
 ultimately serves some self-interest. If personal
 gain is the underlying motive for all calculated
 behavior, its inclusion in the definition of politi-
 cal activity adds nothing and may detract from
 definitional clarity. How is behavior classified if
 it is specified by the organization but also obtains
 rewards for the actor? Including self-interest in
 the definition of OP forces consideration of rou-
 tine job performance as a political act. A suitable
 definition of OP must allow exclusion of routine
 job performance from consideration.
 Field Research
 A growing body of literature relates to the
 social influence process involving use of power
 and its effects on both the agent and the target of
 influence (17, 18). Almost no research has been
 conducted to explore organizational politics per
 se. Studies in print are concerned primarily with
 the effects of influence and power on decision
 processes.
 Interviews and questionnaires were used by
 Strauss (16) to determine which techniques pur-
 chasing agents used to expand their power/in-
 fluence in an organization. Of thirteen tactics
 discovered, he classified three as personal-polit-
 ical. Purchasing decisions were also studied by
 Pettigrew (11) and Patchen (10). Both field studies
 focused on who was influential in making pur-
 chasing decisions, what bases of power were
 used, and what methods of conflict resolution
 were apparent. Although Pettigrew addressed
 the issue of situational uncertainty in its effect on
 the power base of political actors, purchasing de-
 cisions would usually be considered rather struc-
 tured and programmable in nature. Thus political
 activity surrounding these decisions might be re-
 stricted by rational problem solving techniques.
 Although purchasing decisions are generally
 well structured, budget allocations are not. Re-
 cent work assessed the political nature of budg-
 eting decisions in a university (12, 15). Research-
 ers used unobtrusive measures to study the ef-
 fects of departmental power on allocation of
 budgets. Departmental power was highly related
 to the department's ability to obtain outside
 grants and contracts. The greater the depart-
 ment's power, the less budget allocations were
 dependent on universalistic criteria of depart-
 mental work load and student demand for the
 department's courses. To assess the effects of un-
 certainty on criteria used to make research grant
 allocations, this research team in a later study
 (13) again employed unobtrusive measures. Their
 findings indicate that social influence is more
 likely to be used in uncertain situations. Unfor-
 tunately, none of these budgeting studies in-
 volved collecting data from individual actors in
 the decision processes. Influence effects were in-
 ferred from outcomes rather than measurement
 of processual elements.
 Toward A Definition of
 Organizational Politics
 The definitions and research briefly pre-
 sented above allow us to formulate a definition
 of OP that meets certain necessary conditions.
 First, a suitable definition would allow either
 micro or macro levels of analysis - consideration
 of both individual and organizational political
 phenomena. Second, it must allow for the use of
 politics in other than decision processes sur-
 ounding resource allocation. Third, any suitable
 definition of OP must clearly discriminate be-
 tween political and non-political behaviors. For
 example, routine job performance is not a politi-
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 TABLE 1. Dimensions of Organizational Politics
 Influence Ends
 Influence
 Means Organizationally Not Sanctioned
 Sanctioned by Organization
 Organizationally Non-Political Organizationally
 Sanctioned ob Behavior Dysfunctional
 I II Political Behavior
 Not S d Political Behavior 11 IV Organizationally
 Not Sancitioned Potentially Functional Dysfunctional
 by Organization to the Organization Political Behavior
 cal activity but could be considered so if earlier
 constructs are employed.
 What, then, is an acceptable definition of
 organizational politics? A thread of continuity
 through the existing literature is best recognized
 as influence. If outcomes alone are not sufficient
 to define political behavior, the processes
 whereby outcomes are influenced must be ex-
 amined. Thus the notion of influence is a neces-
 sary but not sufficient condition for the infer-
 ence of political action. A supervisor making rou-
 tine job assignments influences the behavior of
 subordinates, but this form of influence is not
 political. Likewise, some forms of influence may
 not be intentional. Politics implies calculated in-
 fluence maneuvering. But even restricting pol-
 itics to calculated influence is not a sufficient
 condition, in that some forms of calculated in-
 fluence should also be excluded from the OP
 construct. Is not the organization itself a form of
 influence calculated to restrict the behavior of
 its members? The organization structure as it ex-
 ists at some given point in time should be ex-
 cluded from the OP construct, although changes
 made to the existing structure could be political-
 ly relevant.
 Therefore OP is a dynamic process of influ-
 ence that produces organizationally relevant
 outcomes beyond the simple performance of job
 tasks. Common organizational practice is to pro-
 vide each member of the organization with a de-
 scription of duties that specifies the organiza-
 tionally desired job outcome and the limits of
 discretionary behavior acceptable in attaining
those outcomes. Thus, the existing organization
 delineates both acceptable outcomes and appro-
 priate means to their attainment for each job po-
 sition. Activities within these sanctioned boun-
 daries must be considered non-political. These
 considerations lead us to the following definition
 of OP:
 Organizational politics is the management of
 influence to obtain ends not sanctioned by
 the organization or to obtain sanctioned
 ends through non-sanctioned influence
 means.
 This approach to a definition of OP is sche-
 matically represented in Table 1. Quadrant I,
 characterized by organizationally specified job
 behavior, is the only non-political quadrant in
 the classification system. Quadrant II contains
political activities recognized by some bureau-
 cratic theorists as abuses of formal authority/
 power (20). Behavior in this quadrant is dysfunc-
 tional from the standpoint of the organization, in
 that organizational resources are being utilized
 to further non-organizational objectives. The bu-
 reaucratic form of organization can be viewed as
 an attempt to eliminate this type of behavior.
 Quadrant III defines political behavior un-
 dertaken to accomplish legitimate organizational
 objectives. The use of charisma or side-payments
 to accomplish sanctioned objectives would be in-




 Formulate End- Identify Determine Mobilize Execute
 Political _ Means _ Targets Incentives _ Incentive Plan and
 Goals Analysis of Desired by Relevant Monitor
 Influence Target Resources Results
 STRATEGY TACTICS
 (Planning) (Implementation)
 FIGURE 1. The Influence Management Process.
 Quadrant II1 activity could be functional to the
 organization if undesirable side-effects did not
 occur. Indeed, some writers view organizational-
 ly functional Quadrant III behavior as leadership
 (5).
 Quadrant IV behavior, like Quadrant II be-
 havior, is dysfunctional from the organizational
 perspective. It deviates from organization norms
 with respect to both outcomes and methods. This
 form of OP will not be tolerated if it is discov-
 ered. Due to the possibility of being dismissed
 from the organization for such actions, individ-
 uals engaging in such behavior probably will be
 highly secretive, making Quadrant IV resistant to
 research attempts.
 The management of influence (the process
 of politics) can be viewed as formulation of polit-
 ical objectives, ends-means analysis leading to
 decisions of strategy and tactics, execution of
 tactics, and feedback/control methods. Figure 1
 is a simplified representation of the process of
 influence management.
 In formulating political objectives,an individ-
 ual within an organization should first take stock
 of whether desired outcomes are sanctioned by
 the organization. The political actor would de-
 termine if these outcomes are attainable through
 solitary action or if other persons must be in-
 volved. This ends-means analysis would lead to
 identification of t rge s of influence and the in-
 centiv s required to effect the desired target be-
 havior (see Figure 1). At this point in the process
 a political objective can be inferred if an individ-
 ual other than the actor must be involved and if
 either the outcomes desired or the means of in-
 fluencing the other person are not sanctioned by
 the organization (see Table 1). Thus the combi-
 nation of outcomes and means employed to
 reach the outcomes defines the political nature
 of the influence process, while the process itself
 is a traditional managerial approach to problem-
 solving.
 Although the influence management proc-
 ess is represented as a series of discrete actions,
 in reality it may be impossible to demonstrate
 clear distinctions among them. For example,
 identification of influence targets and their de-
 sired incentives would be expected to originate
 in the process of ends-means analysis rather than
 to follow it discretely. The concurrent execution
 of two or more stages of the influence manage-
 ment process is highly probable. But this should
 not detract from the utility of this conceptuali-
 zation of the process.
 This view of OP as an influence management
 process allows inclusion of variables already rec-
 ognized by prior researchers. Even the earliest
 political writers were concerned with ends-
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 means analysis as a strategic activity. The vast lit-
 erature dealing with power and its effects fits in-
 to the political process model since influence
 targets (persons) and power bases (resources) are
 included in both strategic and tactical model ele-
 ments. Also implied in this model is the concept
 that political activity can be an on-going organi-
 zational phenomenon such that one political act
 can trigger a chain of related political occur-
 rences.
 With an acceptable definition of organiza-
 tional politics a logical step should be to formu-
 late an integrated theory of OP. The dynamic na-
 ture of the political process seems to dictate a
 systems approach to political conceptualization.
 Within such systems, attention must be directed
 to individual as well as situational variables. For
 example, personality characteristics of political
 actors should be identified; politicians are hy-
 pothesized to differ from other employees in
 their willingness to pursue non-sanctioned ob-
 jectives or in their use of non-sanctioned influ-
 ence means. Non-political employees would be
 expected to discard objectives rather than to vio-
 late organizational sanctions. Situational or struc-
 tural variables would be expected to interact
 with personality variables in the conduct of the
 political process. Some individuals might be ex-
 pected to evidence political behaviors only un-
 de  certain conditions, for example where goals
 or procedures are ill defined or in situations
 where the organization faces considerable un-
 certa nty. Others may derive intrinsic benefits
 from engaging in politics and may do so in almost
 any s tuation. Clearly an opportunity exists in de-
 veloping OP theory to provide a linkage be-
 tween micro-oriented and macro-oriented or-
 ganizational theoreticians.
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 A Life Cycle Approach to Management by Objectives
 ROBERT W. HOLLMANN
 and
 DAVID A. TANSIK
 University of Arizona
 Life Cycle Appr ach to Managem nt by Objectives
 Management by Objectives (MBO) has expe-
 rienced its greatest popularity and organizational
 application during the last ten years. Yet, in spite
 of this increased growth, many organizations
 have dropped MBO and numerous others are dis-
 satisfied with their programs (2, 10). Most of us
 probably know of at least one organization that
 has stopped or is thinking of abandoning its MBO
 program.
 Many of these "failures" and abandonments
 seem to be due to expectations of immediate
 short-run results, accompanied by unwillingness
 to make the long-run commitment necessary for
 development of an effective MBO program. Or-
 ganizations do not adequately account for the
 time dimension of MBO and thus perhaps aban-
 don the program prematurely. They would be
 more inclined to make the requisite time com-
 mitment to MBO by recognizing that starting
 Robert W. Hollmann (Ph.D. - University of Washington) is
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anagement by Objectives (MBO) has expe-
ienced its greatest popularity and organizational
plication during the last ten y ars. Yet, in spite
 this increased growth, many organizations
ave drop ed MBO and umerous others ar  dis-
tisfied with their p og ams (2, 10). Most of us
obably know of at least one rganization that
as stop ed or is thinki g of abandoning its MBO
 such a program entails introduction of a new
 "technology" that must progress through various
 developmental stages before it is effectively inte-
 grated into the organization. These stages of de-
 velopment represent specific "cycles" in the life
 of the new technology (11).
 The Life Cycle Theory
 In studying organizations an important topic
 is how new technologies (products or processes)
 enter and become integrated into the organiza-
 tional workflow. As a management tool or proc-
 ess, MBO can be examined in terms of its intro-
 duction, growth, and effectiveness in organiza-
 tions. In keeping with recent attempts to explain
 the mechanism whereby new technological
 processes are integrated into organizations (3,
 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12), we shall identify several phases
 which are believed to be milestones in the life his-
 tory of a new process.
 Organizational changes, such as the intro-
 duction of MBO, can be understood best by
 viewing change as a process systematically mov-
 ing through distinct developmental stages rather
 a program entails introduction of a new
ology" that must progress through various
lop ental stages before it is effectively inte-
ed into the organization. These tages of de-
ent represent specif c "cy les" in the life
e new technology (11).
 ife Cycle Theory
dying organizations an important topic
 new technologies (products or processes)
 and become integrated into the organiza-
al orkflow. As a management tool r p oc-
, BO can be examined in terms of its intro-
ion, growth, and effectiven ss in organiza-
s. In ke ping with rec nt attempts o explain
 echanism whereby new technological
esses are integrated into rganizations (3,
, 8, 9, 1 , 12), we shall identify several phases
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